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Republican Citizenship 
RICHARD DAGGER 
To speak of republican citizenship is to risk 
confusion, at least in the United States, 
where it is often necessary to explain that 
one is referring to 'small-r' republicanism 
rather than a position taken by the Republi-
can Party. But just as one may be a democrat 
without being a Democrat, so one may be a 
republican without being a Republican. The 
ideas of democracy and the republic are far 
older than any political party and far richer 
than any partisan label can convey - rich 
enough to make the use of 'republican' here 
worth the risk of some initial confusion. 
'Republican' and 'citizen', in fact, are old 
and intertwined words - so old that some 
may wonder at their relevance in the brave 
new world of the twenty-first century, and 
so intertwined that the phrase 'republican 
citizenship' seems almost redundant to 
others. There is no republic without citizens, 
after all; and, according to the classical 
republican thinkers, there is no citizenship, 
in the full sense of the word, except among 
those who are fortunate enough to inhabit a 
republic. But this view of citizenship's con-
nection to republicanism no longer seems to 
prevail. If it did, there would be no need for 
a chapter on republican citizenship in this 
volume of essays on citizenship, for the 
authors would simply assume that citizen-
ship entails republicanism and go on to 
other matters. 
There might also be no need for this 
chapter if it were not for the revival of 
scholarly interest in republicanism in recent 
years. Such a revival has definitely 
occurred, though, and occurred simultane-
ously with a renewed interest in citizenship. 
This coincidence suggests that republican 
citizenship is well worth our attention, not 
only for purposes of historical understand-
ing but also as a way of thinking about 
citizenship in the twenty-first century. Why 
this revival has occurred and whether repub-
lican citizenship truly offers anything of 
relevance or value today are thus the subjects 
of this chapter. 
The first subject, however, must be 
republicanism itself. Rather than attempt to 
survey the long, varied, and often contested 
history of republicanism - a task undertaken 
recently by Oldfield (1990), Rahe (1992), 
Sellers (1998) and others - I begin by trying 
to distill something of the spirit and forms of 
republicanism into a brief but historically 
sensitive account. The second part of the 
chapter then shifts the emphasis to citizen-
ship by explaining, from the republican 
standpoint, its value. Part three takes up the 
revival of interest in republicanism and 
citizenship in the last quarter century or so, 
and the fourth section concludes the chapter 
with a defense of the continuing relevance 
of the republican conception of citizenship. 
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REPUBLICANISM 
'Republic' derives from the Latin res 
publica, the public thing, matter, business, or 
property, with the implication that a republic 
differs from a state or society in which the 
rulers regard everything, including the 
people who inhabit it, as their property. 1 In a 
republic, that is, the government of the state 
or society is a public matter, and the people 
rule themselves. Publicity - the condition of 
being open and public rather than private or 
personal - and self-government thus seem to 
be the essential elements of republicanism. 
But what exactly do publicity and self-
government entail? What is 'the public', and 
how are its members to govern themselves? 
There is no single republican answer to 
these questions. In ancient times, and long 
beyond, republicans typically assumed that 
the public comprised the citizenry, and only 
property-owning, arms-bearing men could 
be citizens. Contemporary republicans 
define the public and citizenship more 
expansively, however, to include women 
and people without property, and nothing in 
the idea of republicanism prevents them 
from doing so. Similar shifts have occurred 
with regard to self-government. When they 
designed representative institutions for the 
new republic, for example, the men who 
drafted the US Constitution knew that they 
were departing from the classical conception 
of self-government as direct participation in 
rule; yet they saw this as an improvement 
within, not an abandonment of, republican 
practice. Whether they were right to think so, 
or whether they sacrificed too much partici-
pation and relied too heavily on representa-
tion, remains a point of contention. But it 
is the commitment to publicity and self-
government that generates this and other 
intramural disputes among republicans. For 
republicans, the question is not whether pub-
licity and self-government are good things; it 
is how best to achieve them. 
One could say the same, of course, about 
liberals, conservatives, socialists, and others 
who claim to promote government of the 
people, by the people, and for the people. 
Publicity and self-government may be the 
essential elements of republicanism, but 
they are not peculiar to it. To the extent that 
they stress the importance of publicity and 
self-government, however, modem political 
theories do so because they draw upon the 
legacy of classical republicanism. To the 
extent that they differ from one another -
and from republicanism - it is because they 
pursue the implications of publicity and self-
govemment in different ways. Thus writers 
such as William Sullivan (1986), Michael 
Sandel ( 1996), and Philip Pettit (1997) 
maintain that liberalism gives too much 
attention to privacy and individual rights 
and too little to fostering the public virtues 
that lead people to do their duties as citizens. 
Liberals and republicans both want to pro-
mote self-government, according to Pettit, 
but liberals make the mistake of thinking 
that all forms of restraint deprive people of 
freedom - even, as we shall see, the 
restraints imposed by a legal system that 
prevent some people from ruling or dominat-
ing others. There is, then, a neo-republican 
school of thought that sees liberalism as a 
misguided rival of republicanism. To others 
with republican sympathies, these differ-
ences are more a matter of emphasis than of 
fundamental commitments. One may be a 
republican and a liberal, on this view, and 
there are reasons to think that republican 
liberalism is an especially attractive politi-
cal philosophy.2 Still, to speak of republican 
liberalism is to acknowledge, first, that 
republicanism and liberalism are not one and 
the same, and, second, that there are more 
and less republican forms of liberalism. 
To understand what is distinctive about 
republicanism, then, we must look more 
closely at the implications republicans draw 
from publicity and self-government. 
In the case of publicity, the implications 
are twofold. The first is that politics, as the 
public's business, must be conducted 
openly, in public. The second is that 'the 
public' is not only a group of people but an 
aspect or sphere of life with its own claims 
and considerations, even if it is not easily 
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distinguished from the private. What makes 
something public is that it involves people 
as members of a community or polity - as 
people joined by common concerns that take 
them out of their private lives and beyond, 
as Tocqueville put it in Democracy in 
America ([1835] 1969: 506), 'the circle of 
family and friends'. One need not go as far 
in this regard as Aristotle - or as Aristotle as 
read by Hannah Arendt (1958: esp. Part 11)-
but all republicans believe that there is 
something enriching about public life, 
regardless of how wearisome it sometimes 
may be. Public life draws people out, and it 
draws them together. It draws out their 
talents and capacities, and it draws them 
together into community - into connection 
and solidarity, and occasionally conflict, with 
other members of the public.3 No matter how 
desirable they may seem to others, neither a 
life of unfettered individualism nor one 
devoted exclusively to family and friends 
will appeal to a republican. 
From these aspects of publicity follow the 
republican emphasis on the rule of law and, 
perhaps most distinctively, civic virtue. The 
public business must be conducted in public 
not only for reasons of convenience - liter-
ally, of coming together - but also in order 
to guard against corruption. As members of 
the public, people must be prepared to over-
come their personal inclinations and set 
aside their private interests when necessary 
to do what is best for the public as a whole. 
The public-spirited citizens who act in this 
way display public or civic virtue. If they 
are to manifest this virtue, furthermore, the 
public must be bound by the rule of law. 
Because it is the public's business, politics 
requires public debate and decisions, which 
in tum require regular, established proce-
dures - that is, rules about who may speak, 
when they may speak, and how decisions 
are to be reached. Decisions must then take 
the form of promulgated rules or decrees 
that guide the conduct of the members of the 
public. From the insistence on publicity, the 
rule of law quickly follows. 4 
The connection of self-government to the 
rule oflaw is at least as strong and immediate. 
If citizens are to be self-governing, they 
cannot be subject to absolute or arbitrary 
rule. If the citizen is to be self-governing, 
then he or she must be free from the 
absolute or arbitrary rule of others. To avoid 
this arbitrariness, citizens must be subject to 
the rule of law - the government of laws, not 
of men, in what was the standard formula. 5 
But it is also important to note that self-
govemment requires self-governing. The 
republican citizen is not someone who acts 
arbitrarily, impulsively, or recklessly, but 
according to laws he or she has a voice in 
making. Again, the need for the rule of law 
is evident. 
As with publicity, the republican commit-
ment to self-government leads to charac-
teristic republican themes, such as the 
republican conception of freedom and, again, 
of civic virtue. Self-government is, of 
course, a form of freedom. For republicans, 
it is the most important form, for other 
forms of individual freedom are secure only 
in a free state, under law. Freedom thus 
requires dependence upon the law so that 
citizens may be independent of the arbitrary 
will of others. In Pettit's tenns, republicans 
are less concerned with freedom from inter-
ference than with freedom from domination 
(1997). 6 It is not interference as such that is 
objectionable but its arbitrariness. A slave 
and a citizen may both suffer interference 
when the former must bow to the will of the 
master and the latter must bow to the law, but 
their conditions are hardly equivalent. The 
master need not consider the slave's desires 
or interests, but the law, at least in the ideal, 
must attend to the interests of the citizen even 
when it interferes with his or her actions. 
Because it protects the citizen against arbi-
trary, unaccountable power, the law is 'the 
non-mastering interferer' that ensures the 
citizen's freedom (Pettit, 1997: 41 ). 
The law only ensures the citizen's freedom, 
however, when it is responsive to the citizenry 
and when the republic itself is secure and 
stable enough for its laws to be effective. 
Sustaining freedom under the rule of law thus 
requires not only active and public-spirited 
participation in public affairs - the civic 
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virtue of the republican citizen - but also the 
proper form of government. This will be 
some version of mixed or balanced govern-
ment, so called because it mixes and 
balances elements of rule by one, rule by the 
few, and rule by the many. As Pocock (1975) 
and others have noted, writers from Polybius 
and Cicero to Machiavelli and the American 
founders celebrated the mixed constitution 
for its ability to stave off corruption and 
tyranny. Monarchy, aristocracy, and rule by 
the people are prone, according to these writ-
ers, to degenerate into tyranny, oligarchy, and 
mob rule, respectively; but a government that 
disperses power among the three elements 
could prevent either the one, the few, or the 
many from pursuing its own interest at the 
expense of the common good. With each 
element holding enough power to check the 
others, the result should be a free, stable, and 
long-lasting government. 
If the mixed constitution is the character-
istic form of the republic, civic virtue is its 
desired substance. Without citizens who are 
willing to defend the republic against 
foreign threats and to take an active part in 
its government, even the mixed constitution 
will fail. Republics must thus engage in 
what Sandel (1996: 6) calls 'a formative 
politics . . . that cultivates in citizens the 
qualities of character that self-government 
requires'. Constitutional safeguards may be 
necessary to resist corruption in the forms of 
avarice, ambition, luxury, and idleness, but 
they will not suffice to sustain freedom 
under the rule of law in the absence of a sig-
nificant degree of virtue among the citizens. 
Seeing to the continuing supply of civic 
virtue through education and other means 
will be, accordingly, one of the principal 
concerns of a prudent republic. 
A prudent republic will also be a small 
one. That, at least, has been the conclusion -
or presumption - of many republicans 
throughout the centuries. 'In a large repub-
lic', as Montesquieu explained in 1748 in 
The Spirit of the Laws (Book VIII, Chap. 16), 
'the common good is sacrificed to a thousand 
considerations; it is subordinated to excep-
tions; it depends upon accidents. In a small 
one, the public good is better felt, better 
known, lies nearer to each citizen; abuses 
are less extensive and consequently less 
protected'. So widespread was this view in 
the late eighteenth century, and so fierce the 
insistence that only a small polity can sus-
tain a republic, that the American authors of 
the Federalist found it necessary to point out 
that Montesquieu had also allowed for the 
possibility of a 'federal' - or 'coNFEDERJ\ TE', 
according to Federalist 9 - republic. Even 
then, the debate over the proposed constitu-
tion often turned on the question of whether 
the United States would become a 'federal' 
or a 'compound' republic - a republic com-
prising thirteen or more smaller republics -
or whether it would become a 'consolidated' 
republic that could not long preserve its 
republican character. 
A small republic or a large (con)federal 
republic: these seem to be the only alter-
natives that the republican tradition allows. 
The concern for size and civic virtue that 
these alternatives reflect testifies to the 
republican belief that citizens must have a 
strong attachment to their polity that grows 
out of a connection to their fellow citizens. 
This connection must work almost immedi-
ately, as in the city-republic, or in building-
block fashion, with the higher and more 
remote layers of government resting on the 
local ones, as in the federal republic. Without 
some connection of this sort, civic virtue will 
not flourish and self-government will not 
survive. Neither will the form of citizenship 
that some have regarded as its only true form. 
THE VALUE OF REPUBLICAN 
CITIZENSHIP 
'We have physicists, geometricians, chemists, 
astronomers, poets, musicians, and painters 
in plenty; but we have no longer a citizen 
among us'. So wrote Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
in his Discourse on the Arts and Sciences 
(Rousseau, [ 1750] 1950: 169). His lament 
echoes today in the writings of those who 
deplore the decline or loss of 'real' or 'true' 
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citizenship - especially in the United States 
and other countries where worries about 
declining electoral participation and eroding 
'social capital' abound (e.g. Putnam, 2000). 
Consciously or not, these laments bespeak a 
desire for a revival of republican citizenship. 
From the republican point of view, 
citizenship has an ethical as well as a legal 
dimension. If it did not, Rousseau's lament 
would make no sense in a world where more 
and more people hold the legal title of citi-
zen. If the lament does make sense, it is 
because we continue to regard citizenship, 
in republican fashion, as an ethos - a way of 
life. Citizenship may be a matter of legal 
status that confers various privileges and 
immunities on the citizen, in other words, 
but it must be more than that. 'Real' or 
'true' citizenship requires commitment to 
the common good and active participation in 
public affairs. It requires civic virtue. 
That is not to say that republicans deni-
grate the legal aspect of citizenship. On 
the contrary, the citizen of a community 
governed by the rule of law must be some-
one who holds the legal rights and duties of 
membership. To say that Joan Smith or Juan 
Sosa is a citizen of a republic is to say that 
Smith or Sosa not only enjoys the protection 
of its laws but is also subject to them. It is 
also to say that, as a citizen, Smith or Sosa 
is supposed to be on an equal footing with 
other citizens. If Smith or Sosa is not treated 
equally under the law, then she or he may 
rightly complain of being a 'second-class 
citizen'. In these respects, legal status is as 
necessary to the republican conception of 
citizenship as to any other. 
Necessary but not sufficient, for it 
requires the supplement of the ethical 
dimension. This ethical aspect of citizenship 
is evident in the theory and practice of the 
Greeks and Romans who bequeathed us the 
concepts of citizenship and republic. 
'Citizen', of course, derives from the Latin 
civis, or member of the civitas (city-state); 
the Latin tenns parallel the Greek polites 
and polis. In ancient Greece and Rome the 
citizen was a full member of the community. 
Every other member - whether woman, 
child, slave, or resident alien - was subject to 
the laws, and might even enjoy some rights 
under them, but only the citizen had the right 
to take part in the government of the 
community. Not only was the citizen entitled 
to engage in civic affairs, he was expected to 
do so. In ancient Athens, this could mean 
that a citizen would have to devote the better 
part of his time and energy to public 
concerns, such as serving on a jury for a full 
year. Such devotion was necessary if he 
was to achieve the ideal of citizenship: to be 
a self-governing member of a self-governing 
community. Those who preferred a more 
private or less arduous life than the citizen's 
could find themselves mocked, as they 
were in Pericles' Funeral Oration, as 'good 
for nothing' (Thucydides, [ 431--41 lBCE] 
1993: 42). Indeed, the Greeks drew a contrast 
between the polites, the citizen expected to 
play a part in public affairs, and the idiotes, 
the private person who could not or would not 
meet this expectation. 
That we no longer regard 'citizen' and 
'idiot' as opposites may be a measure of 
how far we have departed from the classical 
ideal of citizenship. Even so, there is plenty 
of evidence to suggest that the ethical 
dimension of citizenship persists. There is, 
for instance, the fact that we sometimes 
characterize people as good or bad citizens. 
If citizenship were only a matter of legal 
status, we would not be able to distinguish 
'good' citizens from 'bad', or 'true' citizens 
from those who are citizens 'in name only'. 
This point is brought home by those who 
insist that 'every citizen holds office' 
(Kennedy, 1961; Zwiebach, 1975: 87; van 
Gunsteren, 1998: 25). That is, citizens hold 
a position of public responsibility, just as 
mayors, senators, city councillors, and 
members of parliament do. The citizen who 
does not act responsibly may thus be said to 
betray a public trust, while the citizen who 
faithfully does his or her duty displays civic 
virtue. Citizenship has an ethical dimension, 
in short, because there arc standards built 
into the concept of citizenship, just as there 
are standards built into the concepts of 
mayor, teacher, plumber, and physician. In 
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the case of citizenship, moreover, these are 
republican standards, for they stress the 
public nature of citizenship. 
This public nature manifests itself in two 
ways. The first is that the good citizen is a 
public-spirited person who places the inter-
ests of the community ahead of personal 
interests. Such a person will recognize that 
citizenship is a matter of responsibilities as 
much as rights, and the good citizen 
will discharge these responsibilities when 
called upon to do so - from the day-to-day 
demands of obeying traffic laws and respect-
ing the rights of others to the more onerous 
burdens of paying taxes and providing mili-
tary (or some alternative) service. The 
second way in which this commitment to the 
public good manifests itself is in civic 
involvement. Good citizens will undertake 
public responsibilities when called upon, as 
with jury duty, but they will not always wait 
for others to issue the call. Instead, they will 
take an active part in public affairs. They 
need not be 'political junkies' who have 
little interest in any other area of life; they 
may even share Oscar Wilde's concern that 
'socialism [or any political cause] takes too 
many evenings'. But the good citizen will 
not think that an occasional evening devoted 
to public affairs is one too many, nor that 
politics is a nuisance to be avoided or a spec-
tacle to be witnessed. Politics is the public's 
business, and the good citizen, according to 
the republican view, will try to play a well-
informed and public-spirited part in the con-
duct of this business. 
The republican standards embedded in 
the ethical dimension of citizenship thus 
provide an ideal of what a citizen should be. 
Like other ideals, however, republican citi-
zenship can take more or less stringent 
forms. At its most stringent, the republican 
conception seems to demand unquestioning 
loyalty and total sacrifice from the citizen. 
The Spartan mother who supposedly told 
her son to come back a hero from the war or 
to come back on his shield gave voice to this 
view. In its less stringent forms, the republi-
can conception acknowledges that even 
good citizens should not forsake self-interest 
altogether. Tocqueville articulated this 
position when he praised the doctrine of 
'self-interest properly understood'. Paying 
taxes, serving on juries, obeying the law, 
and attending to public affairs require the 
sacrifice of time, attention, and treasure, but 
such sacrifices are necessary if we are to pre-
serve republican government and continue to 
enjoy the rights of the citizen.7 The doctrine 
of 'self-interest properly understood' may 
not inspire extraordinary deeds or heroic sac-
rifices, Tocqueville admitted, 'but every day 
it prompts some small ones; by itself it can-
not make a man virtuous, but its discipline 
shapes a lot of orderly, temperate, moderate, 
careful, and self-controlled citizens. If it does 
not lead the will directly to virtue, it estab-
lishes habits which unconsciously tum it that 
way' ([1835-40] 1969: 526-7). 
As Tocqueville's remarks suggest, the 
person who acquires the habits of the public-
spirited citizen is also likely to become a 
better, more virtuous person in other 
respects. To appreciate how this can happen, 
we need to examine two further dimensions 
of republican citizenship: the integrative 
and the educative. 
Republicans believe that citizenship pro-
vides 'an integrative experience which 
brings together the multiple role activities of 
the contemporary person and demands that 
the separate roles be surveyed from a more 
general point of view' (Wolin, 1960: 434). 
When we act as (republican) citizens, we 
cannot simply speak or vote as parents or 
workers or consumers or members of this 
group or that sect. A policy that will work to 
one's benefit as a consumer may work to 
one's detriment as a worker or parent, for 
instance, so the search for a more synoptic 
understanding of one's interests becomes 
necessary. According to Rousseau, one 
should simply set aside personal interests to 
follow the general will one has as a citizen -
that is, as one who has no interests except as a 
member of the public ([ 1762] 1950, Book II, 
Chs. 1-4). But we cannot truly act as 
members of the public unless we have some 
understanding of the personal interests of 
the people involved. The activity of 
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citizenship - the exchange of views, the 
give-and-take of debate - helps to provide 
this understanding. Indeed, the activity of 
citizenship performs an integrative function 
in two respects: it enables the individual 
to integrate the various roles he or she 
plays, and it integrates individuals into the 
community. 
Assuming that citizenship does in fact 
provide this integrative experience, one may 
still wonder how this helps someone to 
become a better person. The answer is that it 
instills a more secure sense of self, of one's 
identity and integrity as a person. One of the 
most common complaints about modem 
society is that life tends to be divided into a 
series of almost discrete compartments. We 
leave home to go to work, where the divi-
sion of labor often confines us to a narrow 
and repetitive task; we leave work to go 
shopping, where we encounter people we 
know only as clerks and customers; we 
leave the store to drive or ride home, seldom 
seeing a familiar face along the way. Modem, 
urban society presents a far greater range of 
opportunities than earlier forms of society, 
but it also separates people from one another 
and splits their lives into fragments (Wirth, 
1938). To the extent that active citizenship 
requires people to see themselves as more 
than the sum of the various roles they play, 
it will work to establish a secure sense of 
self. Anyone who finds this desirable will 
thus have good reason to believe that the 
integrative aspects of citizenship will be, at 
least in the long term, of personal benefit. 
Of course, there are other ways to deal 
with the multiplicity of roles and the frag-
mentation of identity characteristic of 
modem life. One way is to withdraw into a 
cave; another is to join an all-embracing 
community of like-minded people. Yet 
another is to concentrate, so far as the insis-
tent demands of modem life will allow, on a 
single role - parent, perhaps, or soldier or 
scholar - to the virtual exclusion of all 
others. From the republican standpoint. 
however, citizenship offers a better alterna-
tive because it promises an educative as well 
as an integrative experience. 
Perhaps the best way to make this point is 
in terms of a distinction Dennis Thompson 
draws between Rousseau's 'patriotic' and 
John Stuart Mill's 'enlightened' conception 
of citizenship (Thompson, 1976: 43-50). 
For Rousseau's austere republicanism, the 
true citizen puts the good of the community 
above all other considerations. Citizenship 
demands simplicity- a whole-hearted devo-
tion to duty - rather than sophistication. For 
Mill's liberal republicanism, however, good 
citizens are people who develop their facul-
ties through active engagement in public 
life. As Mill argues in Representative 
Government, the individual stands to gain 
from the intellectual growth, the practical 
discipline, and 
the moral part of the instruction 
afforded by the participation of the pri-
vate citizen, if even rarely, in public 
functions. He is called upon, while so 
engaged, to weigh interests not his own; 
to be guided, in case of conflicting 
claims, by another rule than his private 
partialities; to apply, at every tum, prin-
ciples and maxims which have for their 
reason of existence the common good: 
and he usually finds associated with him 
in the same work minds more familiar-
ized than his own with these ideas and 
operations, whose study it will be to 
supply reasons to his own understand-
ing, and stimulation to his feelings for 
the general interest. He is made to feel 
himself one of the public, and whatever 
is for their benefit to be for his benefit. 
(Mill, [1861] 1975: 196-7) 
On Mill's account, then, active citizen-
ship educates people by drawing out abili-
ties that might otherwise remain untapped or 
unfulfilled, Because these abilities will 
prove valuable in other aspects of the 
citizens' lives as well, the educative dimen-
sion of citizenship clearly promises to work 
to their benefit. 
Two other features of this educative 
dimension are noteworthy. Both pertain to 
'the moral part of the instruction' afforded 
by pmiicipation in public affairs. The first 
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is that this part1c1pation leads individuals 
to Tocqueville's doctrine of 'self-interest 
properly understood'. For reasons Mill set 
out, active citizenship widens individuals' 
horizons and deepens their sense of how their 
lives are involved with others', including the 
lives of people who are unknown to them. In 
this way participation works to overcome 
individualism as Tocqueville understood it: 
'a calm and considered feeling which dis-
poses each citizen to isolate himself from the 
mass of his fellows and withdraw into the 
circle of family and friends; with this little 
society formed to his taste, he gladly leaves 
the greater society to look after itself 
([1835--40] 1969: 506). Republican citizen-
ship works to overcome this pernicious form 
of individualism by fostering the individual's 
sense of himself or herself as a part of, rather 
than apart from, the public. 
It is also important to notice how partici-
pation encourages public-spirited citizen-
ship. The legal dimension of citizenship 
inclines us to think of citizenship in categor-
ical terms: either one is a citizen of a certain 
polity or one is not. From the ethical per-
spective, however, one can be more or less 
of a citizen - a 'real' citizen, a citizen 'in 
name only', or something in between. Mill's 
insight is that real citizenship can be culti-
vated by encouraging those who are citizens 
in name only to join in public life. From 
modest beginnings in occasional activities 
that require one to 'weigh interests not 
his own' and to look beyond 'his private 
partialities', political participation can trans-
form the nominal citizen into one who, 
'made to feel himself one of the public', is 
moved to act by the desire to promote the 
common good. Participation in public life 
thus seems to be a pathway to, as well as a 
defining feature of, republican citizenship. 
REVIVING REPUBLICAN CITIZENSHIP 
The belief that participation in public life is 
neither as extensive nor as intensive as it 
ought to be is largely responsible for the 
recent revival of interest in both citizenship 
and republicanism. The complaint is not so 
much that civic life in the advanced democ-
racies has declined dramatically from some 
golden age as that it has failed to realize the 
promise of republican citizenship. This 
complaint, for instance, animated the work 
of Hannah Arendt in the middle of the 
twentieth century. Technology has eased the 
burdens of labor and freed people to act as 
citizens in the public realm, she argued in 
The Human Condition (1958), yet we tum 
away from public life and toward private 
consumption. We want governments to pro-
vide for the welfare of the citizenry, she 
declared in On Revolution, but we 'deny the 
very existence of public happiness and 
public freedom' as we 'insist that politics is 
a burden .. .' (1965: 273). We are, in short, 
squandering an opportunity to achieve what 
the republicans of ancient Greece and Rome 
thought impossible - a polity in which the 
freedom of republican self-government is 
available not only to the well-to-do few but 
to almost the entire people. 
Similar concerns lie behind the republi-
can revival of the last quarter-century or so. 
In this case, neo-republicans tend to place 
the blame on one, or both, of two theories 
they regard as pernicious. One of these is 
liberalism; the other is the tendency to 
reduce politics to the market place. 
According to such critics as Sandel ( 1982, 
1996), Sullivan ( 1986), Pettit ( 1997), and 
Barber (1984 ), the liberal emphasis on indi-
vidual rights and liberties has worked to 
loosen civic bonds and undermine self-
govemment. As Sandel puts it, 'the civic or 
formative aspect of our [American] politics 
has largely given way to the liberalism that 
conceives persons as free and independent 
selves, unencumbered by moral or civic ties 
they have not chosen' (1996: 6). This 'vol-
untarist' or 'procedural' liberalism, as found 
in the works of liberal philosophers such as 
John Rawls (1971, 1993) and the legal deci-
sions of liberal jurists, has fostered a society 
in which individuals fail to understand how 
much they owe to the community. The chief 
purpose of the state, accordingly, is to 
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arbitrate the conflicting claims of these 
individuals as they pursue their disparate 
conceptions of the good life. Such a society 
will be self-subverting, Sandel insists, for it 
'fails to capture those loyalties and respon-
sibilities whose moral force consists partly 
in the fact that living by them is inseparable 
from understanding ourselves as the particu-
lar persons we are - as members of this 
family or city or nation or people, as bearers 
of that history, as citizens of this republic' 
(1996: 14). Where such loyalties and 
responsibilities cannot be sustained, self-
government cannot survive. Hence the need 
for a republican revival. 
Others have reached this conclusion in 
reaction to the tendency of many political 
scientists and economists to think of politics 
as a form of economic activity. In politics 
and public affairs, according to this view 
(e.g. Schumpeter, 1962; Downs, 1957), the 
citizen is essentially a consumer. Political 
parties offer candidates and platforms in 
an attempt to win votes, and sensible 
consumer-citizens vote so as to strike the 
best bargain for themselves. If they decide 
that the political market place offers nothing 
appealing, or that their resources are better 
invested elsewhere, consumer-citizens will 
stay away from the ballot box and quite 
wisely forsake political activity. They may 
even find that it is rational for them to 
remain largely ignorant of public affairs. 
There is little that one vote can accomplish, 
after all, so why waste time studying the 
issues and assessing the candidates in order 
to cast a meaningless vote?8 
This way of thinking about citizen-
ship and politics is far removed from the 
republican ideal of civic virtue. Conceiving 
of the citizen as a consumer may capture the 
legal dimension of citizenship, but there is 
no room in this conception for the ethical, 
integrative, or educative aspects of citizen-
ship. Indeed, one republican response is to 
say that the consumer-citizen is a citizen in 
name only: 'Market theories of political 
exchange which reduce the citizen to a 
"consumer" or "customer" are not so much 
amoral - although they are that too - as 
trivial: a reductio ad absurdum' (Selbourne, 
1994: 14).9 
Republican critics also point to other 
problems with the market model of politics, 
notably the problem of generating obedi-
ence and allegiance. If citizens arc merely 
consumers and the political order, like the 
market, is merely a mechanism for coordi-
nating and aggregating the citizens' prefer-
ences, there is no satisfactory answer to the 
question, 'What reason has anyone to accept 
the decision that emerges from the process 
of interest-aggregation?' (Miller, 1989: 
257). Appeals to solidarity or civic virtue 
are not available to the advocates of the 
market model, of course. In such a 'resolu-
tely individualistic' conception of politics, 
people 'are essentially competitors - rivals 
for space, for resources, for power . . . The 
only bonds between citizens arc contractual 
in nature, formed by agreements based on 
the self-interest of the parties involved' 
(Spragens, 1990: 139-40). Where self-
interest does not dictate allegiance, there is 
simply no reason to obey the law or remain 
loyal. 
To be sure, self-interest does dictate that 
people obey the law when they are likely to 
be punished if they do not. The proponents 
of the market model may thus argue that 
allegiance and cooperation are secured by 
the coercive force of the government. When 
obedience seems burdensome, however, the 
law and those who enforce it will be 
resented as obstacles, or even opponents, 
that block the satisfaction of the consumer-
citizen's desires. Government and law soon 
appear to be alien forces imposed on one -
not forms of self-rule but forces to be 
circumvented whenever possible. As law-
breaking increases, and their own interests 
suffer, consumer-citizens have no recourse 
but to call for more police, more jails, and 
more coercion. This reliance on coercion 
reveals a most embarrassing problem for the 
market model of politics: its inefficiency. 
As Diego Gambetta observes, '[S]ocieties 
which rely heavily on the use of force are 
likely to be less efficient, more costly, and 
more unpleasant than those where trust is 
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maintained by other means. In the former, 
resources tend to be diverted away from 
economic undertakings and spent in coer-
cion, surveillance, and information gather-
ing, and less incentive is found to engage in 
cooperative activities' (1988: 220-1). Such 
inefficiency demonstrates how the market 
model undermines itself. Citizens who think 
of themselves as consumers will surely prize 
efficiency. Yet the more citizens think of 
themselves as consumers, the more likely 
they are to rely on the inefficient means of 
coercion to secure compliance with the 
laws. On its own grounds, then, the concep-
tion of the citizen as consumer is inferior to 
a conception of citizenship that generates 
cooperation on the basis of solidarity and 
civic duty. Such a conception will be, at 
least to some extent, republican. 
As with other revivals, in sum, the revival 
of interest in republicanism and in citizen-
ship grows out of the sense that something 
valuable is in danger of being lost. That loss, 
in this case, will have grievous conse-
quences for political stability and individual 
freedom, for one cannot be a free person, in 
the republican view, unless one is a citizen 
of a free, self-governing political commu-
nity (Miller, 1991: 3). And such a commu-
nity cannot be sustained unless a substantial 
number of citizens (in the legal sense) 
undertakes the active life of the public-
spirited citizen. 
THE RELEVANCE OF REPUBLICAN 
CITIZENSHIP 
There is a sense in which all revivals are 
backward-looking, and one may wonder 
whether the attempt to revive the republican 
ideal of citizenship looks so far back - to the 
Greek polis, the Roman civitas, and the 
Italian city-republics of the Middle Ages -
as to be irrelevant to life in the twenty-first 
century. Thomas Jefferson's agrarian 
republicanism is a case in point. Jefferson 
may have been right two hundred years ago 
to praise the small farmer as the model of 
the independent citizen who would rather 
live frugally on land he and his family 
worked than succumb to the luxury and 
corruption of urban life (Jefferson, 1999: 
549-50, 28). Such praise, however, seems 
little more than nostalgia in today's world of 
global agribusiness and 'e-commerce'. 
What may be said, then, for the relevance of 
republican citizenship today? What may be 
said for it, moreover, in light of the biases 
implicit in the republican ideal of the 
property-owning, arms-bearing citizen? 
We thus have two criticisms to consider 
by way of concluding the case for republi-
can citizenship in this chapter. The first is 
that the republican conception of citizenship 
is no longer realistic, if ever it was; the 
second is that the conception poses a threat 
to an open, egalitarian, and pluralistic 
society. This second criticism is put force-
fully by Iris Marion Young, who detects a 
denial of 'difference' in republican attempts 
to establish a 'civic public': 
This ideal of the civic public ... 
excludes women and other groups 
defined as different, because its ratio-
nal and universal status derives only 
from its opposition to affectivity, par-
ticularity, and the body .... [I]n so far as 
he is a citizen every man leaves behind 
his particularity and difference, to 
adopt a universal standpoint identical 
for all citizens, the standpoint of the 
common good or general will. In prac-
tice republican politicians enforced 
homogeneity by excluding from citizen-
ship all those defined as different. .. 
(1990: 117). 
Space does not permit a full consideration 
of this criticism, but three points may be 
made here. 10 One is that there is a strong 
republican strain in the writings not only 
of pioneering feminists, such as Mary 
Wollstonecraft (1794), but also of some 
recent feminists (e.g. Dietz, 1985, 1990). A 
second point is that politics will be a tricky 
business indeed if concern for difference 
rules out attempts to find a common good. 
Young wants 'claimants to justify their 
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demands before others who explicitly stand 
in different social locations' (1990: 190). 
But how is a decision to emerge from the 
conflicting claims of people in these 'differ-
ent social locations' if no appeal to a 
common good or to the standpoint of the 
citizen is allowed? To be sure, Young's 
point is that the search for common ground 
serves to justify the dominance of a particu-
lar - and typically affluent, white, male -
group. But if there is no common good or 
common ground, then it is difficult to see 
how public decisions, including those of the 
'heterogeneous public' she recommends 
( 1990: 190), can be justified. 
The third point concerns the claim that 
citizenship involves a false ideal of impar-
tiality. Here the republican response is to 
deny that the ideal is false. We should 
indeed strive to think and act, when estab-
lishing laws and policies, as members of the 
public rather than self-interested indivi-
duals. But this does not mean that we cannot 
take account of the particular needs and 
interests of the people - even people who 
'stand in different social locations' - who 
compose the polity. Republican citizenship, 
again, is integrative. It requires us to bring 
together the facets of our individual lives as 
best we can. In working toward policies and 
laws that we can agree to despite our differ-
ences, citizenship also helps us to find unity 
in the midst of diversity. But it does not 
require that we surrender our particular 
identities or deny the value of diversity. 
That is not to say that 'difference' and 
cultural pluralism do not present difficulties 
for a 'civic public', for they do. But differ-
ence and pluralism present difficulties for 
all kinds of polities, and republican citizen-
ship at least has the virtue of confronting 
them head on by encouraging people to look 
for the common ground on which they 
stand, despite their differences, as citizens. 
In that respect, there is surely something to 
be said for the relevance of republican 
citizenship. 
There is also something to be said in 
response to the first criticism - that 
republican citizenship is an irredeemably 
nostalgic ideal in this age of globalization. 
In this case the republican response is to 
point out that fear of dependence and hatred 
of corruption are still very much with us, 
and one need not be the yeoman farmer of 
Jefferson's vision to enjoy the kind of inde-
pendence necessary to republican citizen-
ship. The challenge is to find ways to adapt 
these enduring republican concerns to the 
circumstances of vast polities that are them-
selves entangled in a 'global economy 
whose frenzied flow of money and goods, 
information and images, pays little heed to 
nations, much less neighborhoods' (Sandel, 
1996: 317). To those who would take up this 
challenge, republicanism offers guidance of 
both a general and a particular kind. 
In general, the republican advice is to build 
community. Among other things, this means 
that a republican cannot be a wholehearted 
cosmopolitan (Miller, 1999; Dagger, 2001). 
To be a citizen, in the republican view, is to 
be a partner in a common enterprise, and 
people will be likely to put the common 
interest ahead of their own - to act as true 
citizens - only when they feel themselves to 
be part of such an enterprise. The Internet and 
satellite television are unlikely to inspire this 
sense of community on a global basis. 
The republican, however, will also note 
that genuine communities come in many 
different forms, not all of which are 
hospitable to the republican ideal of self-
government. Republicanism thus points 
toward particular characteristics to be culti-
vated in political communities. Indeed, we 
may say that the republican model of the 
good community exhibits the following five 
characteristics: fair treatment under the rule 
of law prevails; economic arrangements and 
the distribution of wealth promote citizen-
ship rather than consumerism; preparing 
children for a life of responsible citizenship 
is a leading aim of education; civic design 
strengthens neighborhoods and public spirit; 
and opportunities for participation in public 
affairs, including programs of civic service, 
are abundant. 
Much more needs to be said on each of 
these five points, of course, to clarify and 
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bolster the case for republican citizenship. 
That so much may be said, however, and 
that neo-republicans and republican liberals 
NOTES 
1 Cicero made this point in his Republic when he asked 
(Book III, 43), 'So who would call that a republic, i.e., the 
property of the public, when everyone was oppressed by 
the cruelty of a single man ... ?' As the subsequent discus-
sion, in his dialogue indicates, Cicero believed that rule by 
the few and rule by the many could also be tyrannical -
and therefore not republican. 
2 As I argue in Dagger ( 1997). For criticism of 
Sandel's and Pettit's attempts to distinguish republicanism 
from liberalism, see Dagger (1999 and 2000, respec-
tively). Others who believe it is a mistake to divorce 
republicanism from liberalism include Terchek (1997) and 
Spragens (1999). 
3 On this point note Spragens's (1999: 186-7) remarks 
on 'civic friendship': 
'It is not only close friends who may share the 
common interests, common attachments, common 
purposes, and common values that generate the 
behavioral cohesion of amicable and cooperative 
association. Quite large groups of people may share 
these goods in common, and on the basis of pursuing 
them together they may form the quasi-erotic bonds 
of social concord Aristotle referred to as homonoia: 
'friendship between the citizens of a state, its 
province being the interests and concerns of life'. 
[Nichomachean Ethics, Book IX, Chap. 6] 
4 This connection is manifest in Cicero's famous defini-
tion (Republic, Book I, 39) of the republic as 'a numerous 
gathering brought together by legal consent [ iuris consensu] 
and community of interest'. See also Book III, 45 - 'there 
is no public except when it is held together by a legal agree-
ment' - and, for analysis and assessment, Schofield ( 1995). 
5 Historians (Wirszubski, I 960: 9; Skinner, 1998: 45) 
trace this formula to the Roman writers Sallust, Livy, and 
Cicero. 
6 On Pettit's account (1997: 80), 'freedom as 
non-domination' is the 'supreme political value' of the 
republican tradition. 
7 Quentin Skinner (1991) makes a similar point with 
regard to Machiavelli and other republicans. 
8 So, at least, went the argument before the closely 
contested US presidential election of 2000. 
9 See also Ball (1988: Ch. 6) on the distinction 
between 'economic' and 'educative' democracy. 
10 For more detailed discussion, see Miller ( 1995) and 
Dagger (1997: 176-81). 
I am grateful to Terence Ball and Engin !sin for 
helpful comments on an earlier draft of this chapter. 
are now beginning to say it, is perhaps the 
best testimony to the continuing relevance 
of the republican ideal of citizenship. 
REFERENCES 
Arendt, Hannah (1958) The Human Condition. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Arendt, Hannah (1965) On Revolution. New York: Viking 
Press. 
Ball, Terence (1988) Transforming Political Discourse: 
Political Theory and Critical Conceptual History. 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Barber, Benjamin (1984) Strong Democracy: Participa-
tory Politics for a New Age. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
Cicero (1998) The Republic and The Laws tr. N. Rudd. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Dagger, Richard (1997) Civic Virtues: Rights, Citizenship, 
and Republican Liberalism. New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press. 
Dagger, Richard (1999) 'The Sandelian Republic and the 
Encumbered Self', Review of Politics, 61 (2): 181-217. 
Dagger, Richard (2000) 'Republicanism Refashioned: 
Comments on Pettit's Theory of Freedom and Govern-
ment', The Good Society, 9 (3): 50-53. 
Dagger, Richard (2001) 'Republicanism and the Politics 
of Place', Philosophical Exp/orations, 4 (3): 157-73. 
(Autumn 2001). 
Dietz, Mary ( 1985) 'Citizenship with a Feminist Face: 
The Problem with Maternal Thinking', Political 
Theory, 13 (1): 19-37. 
Dietz, Mary (1990) 'Hobbes's Subject as Citizen', in 
Mary Dietz (ed.), Thomas Hobbes and Political Theory. 
Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas. 
Downs, Anthony (1957) An Economic Theory of"Democ-
racy. New York: Harper and Row. 
Gambetta, Diego (1988) 'Can We Trust Trust?', in Diego 
Gambetta (ed.), Trust: Making and Breaking Coopera-
tive Relations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Jefferson, Thomas ( 1999) Political Writings. Joyce 
Applely and Terence Ball (eds). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Kennedy John F. (1961) 'Every citizen holds office', NEA 
Journal 50 (October): 18-20. 
Mill, John Stuart ((1861] 1975) Three Essays: 'On 
Liberty', 'Representative Government', and 'The Sub-
jection of Women'. R. Wollheim. (ed) Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Miller, David (1989) Market. State, and Community. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Miller, David (1991) 'Introduction', in David Miller (ed.), 
Liberty. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Miller, David ( 1995) 'Citizenship and Pluralism', Politi-
cal Studies, 43 (3): 432-50. 
Republican Citizenship 157 
Miller, David (1999) 'Bounded Citizenship', in Kimberly 
Hutchings and Roland Dannreuther (eds), Cosmopoli-
tan Citizenship. New York: St. Martin's Press. 
Oldfield, Adrian ( 1990) Citizenship and Community. Lon-
don: Routledge. 
Pettit, Philip ( 1997) Republicanism: A Theo1y of Freedom 
and Government. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Pocock, J.G.A. (1975) The Machiavellian Moment: 
Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republi-
can Tradition. Princeton, NJ; Princeton University 
Press. 
Putnam, Robert (2000) Bowling Alone: The Collapse and 
Revival of American Community. New York: Simon 
and Schuster. 
Rahe, Paul ( 1992) Republics Ancient and Modern: Classi-
cal Republicanism and the American Revolution. 
Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press. 
Rawls, John (1971) A Theo1y a/Justice. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
Rawls, John (!993) Political Liberalism. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques ([1750; 1762] 1950) The Social 
Contract and the Discourses, tr. G.D.H. Cole. 
New York: E.P. Dutton. 
Sandel, Michael (1982) Liberalism and the Limits of 
Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Sandel, Michael ( 1996) Democracy s Discontent: 
America in Search ofa Public Philosophy. Cambridge. 
MA: Harvard University Press. 
Schofield, Malcolm (l 995) 'Cicero's Definition of Res 
Publica', in J.G.F. Powell (ed.), Cicero the Philo-
sopher: Twelve Papers. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Schumpeter, Joseph ( 1962) Capitalism. Socialism, and 
Democracy, 3rd ed. New York: Harper and Row. 
Selboume, David ( 1994) The Principle ofDuty: An Essay 
on the Foundations of the Cil"ic Order. London: 
Sinclair-Stevenson. 
Sellers, M.N.S. (1998) The Saued Fire of Liherty: 
Repuhlicanism, Liberalism, and the Law. London: 
Macmillan. 
Skinner, Quentin (l 99 l) 'The Paradoxes of Political 
Liberty', in David Miller (ed.), Libaty. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Skinner, Quentin (1998) Liberty Befim" Liberalism. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Spragens, Thomas A., Jr. (1990) Reason and Denwcracv. 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
Spragens, Thomas A., Jr. (I 999) Ci1"ic Liberalism: Reflec-
tions on Our Democratic Ideals. Lanham, MD: 
Rowman and Littlefield. 
Sullivan, William (1986) Reconstmcting Public Philo-
sophy. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press. 
Terchek, Ronald. (I 997) Republican Paradoxes and 
Liberal Anxieties. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. 
Thompson, Dennis (1976) John Stuart ,!,,fill and Repre-
sentatii·e Government. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Tocqueville, Alexis de ([1835-40] l 969). Democracy in 
America. tr. G. Lawrence, ed. J.P. Mayer. Garden City, 
NY: Doubleday. 
Thucydides ([431-41 !BCE] 1993) On Justice, P01ve1: 
and Human Nature: Selections.fi"Om 'The flist01y of the 
Peloponnesian ffor '. tr. P. Woodruff. Indianapolis, IN: 
Hackett Publishing. 
van Gunsteren, Hennan (I 998) A Theo1}' o( Citi::enship: 
Organizing Plurality in Contemporwy Democracies. 
Boulder, Co and Oxford: Westview Press. 
Wirszubski, Ch. (I 960) Libertas as a Political Idea at 
Rome During the Late Republic and Earlr Principate. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Wirth, Louis (1938) 'Urbanism as a Way of Life', 
American Journal o(Sociolog;'. 44: 1-24. 
Wolin, Sheldon (l 960) Politics and Visions: Continuitv 
and lnnorntion in Western Political Thought. Boston: 
Little, Brown. 
Wollstonecraft, Mary (I 794) A Vindication of" the Rights 
of fVoman. Philadelphia: Matthew Carey. 
Young, Iris M. (l 990) Justice and the Politics of" Dif/Cr-
ence. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Zwiebach, Burton ( l 975) Cil"ility and Disohedience. 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
